
Seminario de Economía Política: Autocracia, Democracia y Elecciones

Escuela Internacional de Economía
Universidad Javeriana
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Descripción

En la primera mitad del curso cubriremos algunas ideas centrales en la literatura de Economía Política. Comenzaremos discutiendo la naturaleza del poder político, diferentes tipos de instituciones políticas -democracias, autocracias-, y procesos de cambio institucional como democratizaciones, y revoluciones. Estudiaremos las consecuencias económicas y sociales de la democracia, problemas de agencia centrales en la arena política, la naturaleza de la corrupción, el problema de acción colectiva y la creación de capacidad estatal.

La segunda mitad del curso se concentrará en examinar un componente básico de la democracia: las elecciones. En particular, estudiaremos cómo y bajo que condiciones, las elecciones permiten la selección de buenos líderes y crean incentivos en los políticos de seguir los intereses de sus electores. La información disponible sobre los candidatos por los votantes, arreglos institucionales como la reelección, y la manera en que los votantes evalúan el desempeño de los políticos, recibirán especial atención. Hacia el final del curso exploraremos la forma en que las reglas electorales se rompen y las consecuencias que esto trae a la democracia.

Evaluación

Al final del curso los estudiantes tomarán un examen con el que se evaluará la comprensión de las lecturas cubiertas en el curso. El examen constituye 70% de la nota final. El 30% restante será asignado de acuerdo a la participación en clase de los estudiantes.

Organización

El curso será dictado en doce sesiones de tres horas y media cada una.

Programa del curso

- La Naturaleza del Poder Político: ¿Importa la Política? (Lunes, 24 de Junio)
 - Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics”, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31(4): 620–652.
 - Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, y James A. Robinson (2006). “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf (eds.), *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Vol. 1A, Ch. 6, pp. 385-472, North-Holland.
 - Udry, Christopher y Markus Goldstein (2008). “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6): 981–1022.

- Democratización
 - Acemoglu, Daron y James A. Robinson (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Ch. 5-7, Cambridge University Press.
 - Acemoglu, Daron y James A. Robinson (2000). “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4): 1167–1199.
 - Acemoglu, Daron y James A. Robinson (2001). “A Theory of Political Transition”, *American Economic Review*, 91(4): 938–963.
 - Aidt, Toke y Raphael Frank (2015). “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832”, *Econometrica*, 83(2): 505–547.

- Democracia en Acción (Martes, 25 de Junio)
 - Baland, Jean-Marie y James Robinson (2008). “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile”, *American Economic Review*, 98(5): 1737–1765.
 - Baland, Jean-Marie y James Robinson (2012). “The Political Value of Land”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3): 601–619.
 - Cascio Elizabeth y Ebonya Washington (2013). “Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1): 379–433.
 - Lott, John y Lawrence Kenny (1999). “Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?”, *The Journal of Political Economy*, 107(6): 1163–1198.
 - García-Jimeno, Camilo (2016). “The Political Economy of Moral Conflict: An Empirical Study of Learning and Law Enforcement under Prohibition”. *Econometrica*, 84(2): 511–570.

- Meyersson, Erik (2014). “Islamic Rule and the Empowerment of the Poor and Pious”, *Econometrica*, 82(1): 229–269.
- Miller, Grant (2008). “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3): 1287–1327.
- Revolución (Miércoles, 26 de Junio)
 - Roemer, John E. (1985). “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology”, *Econometrica*, 53(1): 85–108.
 - Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, y James Robinson (2011). “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution”, *American Economic Review*, 101(7): 3286–3307.
 - Chaney, Eric (2013). “Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power”, *Econometrica*, 81(5): 2033–2053.
- Autocracia
 - Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson y Thierry Verdier (2004) “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule,” The Alfred Marshall Lecture, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2(2): 162–192.
 - Padro-i-Miguel, Gerard (2007). “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 74(4):1259–1274.
- Agencia y Corrupción (Jueves, 27 de Junio)
 - Maskin, Eric y Jean Tirole (2004). “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government”, *American Economic Review*, 94(4): 1034–1054.
 - Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman, y Faruk Gul (2000). “The Dynamics of Political Compromise”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108(3): 531–568.
 - Acemoglu, Daron y Thierry Verdier (2000). “The Choice Between Corruption and Market Failures”, *American Economic Review*, 90, (1): 194–211.
 - Banerjee, Abhijit (1997). “A Theory of Misgovernance”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4): 1289–1332.
 - Ferraz, Claudio y Frederico Finan (2008). “The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2): 703–745.
- Acción Colectiva (Viernes, 28 de Junio)
 - Alesina, Alberto y Eliana La Ferrara (2000). “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3): 847–904.

- Banerjee, Abhijit, Kaivan Munshi, Dilip Mookherjee, y Debraj Ray (2001). “Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(1): 138–190.
 - Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer, y Rohini Somanathan (2008). “Public Action for Public Goods”, in Paul Schultz and John Strauss (eds.), *Handbook of Development Economics*, 4(49): 3117–3154.
 - Dippel, Christian (2014). “Forced Coexistence and Economic Development: Evidence from Native American Reservations”, *Econometrica*, 82(6): 2131–2165.
 - Esteban, Joan Maria y Debraj Ray (2001). “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox”, *The American Political Science Review*, 95(3): 663–672.
 - Garcia-Jimeno, Camilo, Angel Iglesias, y Pinar Yildirim (2018). “Women, Rails, and Telegraphs: An Empirical Study of Information Diffusion, Social Interactions, and Collective Action”, unpublished, University of Pennsylvania.
- Capacidad Estatal (Sábado, 29 de Junio)
 - Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, y James A. Robinson (2015). “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach”. *American Economic Review*, 105(8): 2364–2409.
 - Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda, y Louis Putterman (2002). “States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7: 347-69.
 - Gennaioli, Nicola y Ilija Rainer (2007). “The Modern Impact of Pre-Colonial Centralization in Africa”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3): 185–234.
 - Michalopoulos, Stelios y Elias Papaioannou (2013). “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, *Econometrica*, 81(1): 113–152.
 - Koyama, Mark, Chiaki Moriguchi, y Tuan-Hwee Sng (2015). “Geopolitics and Asia’s Little Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of State Building in China and Japan after 1850”, Unpublished.
 - Políticos, Incentivos, y Elecciones I (Lunes, 1 de Julio)
 - Besley, Timothy (2007). “Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government”. New York: NY: Oxford University Press. Ch. 3.
 - Fearon, James (1999). “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types vs. Sanctioning Poor Performance” in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.) *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. London: Cambridge University Press.
 - Ferejohn, John (1986). “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control”, *Public Choice* 50(1): 5–25.

- Alesina, Alberto y Guido Tabellini (2007). “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task”, *American Economic Review*, 97(1): 169–179.
- Políticos, Incentivos, y Elecciones II (Martes, 2 de Julio)
 - Bobonis, Gustavo J., Cañara Fuertes, Luis R., y Rainer Schwabe (2016). “Monitoring Corruptible Politicians”, *American Economic Review*, 106(8): 2371–2405.
 - Ferraz, Claudio y Frederico Finan (2011). “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments”, *American Economic Review*, 101(4): 1274–1311.
 - McMillan, John y Pablo Zoido (2004). “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(4): 69–92.
 - Svobik, Milan (2013). “Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3): 685–702.
- ¿Son los Votantes Racionales? (Miércoles, 3 de Julio)
 - Achen, Christopher y Larry M. Bartels (2016). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do not Produce Responsive Governments*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ch.5.
 - Ashworth, Scott, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, y Amanda Friedenberg (2018). “Learning About Voter Rationality” *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1): 37–54.
 - Edward L. Glaeser y Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto. “Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth” NBER Working Paper 23683.
 - Healy, Andrew y Neil Malhotra (2009). “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy”, *American Political Science Review*, 103(3): 387–406.
- Manipulación Electoral y Clientelismo (Jueves, 4 de Julio)
 - Ascencio, Sergio y Miguel R. Rueda (2018). “Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation”, forthcoming at *The American Political Science Review*.
 - Finan, Frederico y Laura A. Schechter (2012). “Vote Buying and Reciprocity” *Econometrica* 80(2): 863–881.
 - Ichino, Nahomi y Matthias Schundeln (2012). “Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana” *The Journal of Politics* 74(1): 292–307.
 - Rueda, Miguel y Nelson Ruiz (2018). “Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption”, Unpublished Manuscript. Emory University.

- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina”, *American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 315–325.
- Wantchekon, Leonard (2003). “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin”, *World Politics*, 55: 399–422.
- Violencia y Elecciones (Viernes, 5 de Julio)
 - Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson y Rafael Santos (2013). “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11: 5–44.
 - Blattman, Christopher (2009). “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda”, *American Political Science Review*, 103(2): 231–247.
 - Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver, y Austin L. Wright (2018). “The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence”, *American Economic Review*, 108(11): 3199–3231.
 - Kavakli Kerim Can y Patrick M. Kuhn (2018). “Dangerous Contenders: Election Monitors, Islamist Opposition and Terrorism”, forthcoming *International Organization*.
- Persuasión, Medios, e Ideología (Sábado, 6 de Julio)
 - Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova y Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2011). “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia”, *American Economic Review*, 101(7): 3252–3285.
 - Gregory, Martin J. y Ali Yurukoglu (2017). “Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization”, *American Economic Review*, 107(9): 2565–2599.
 - Kendall, Chad, Tommaso Nannicini, y Francesco Trebbi (2015). “How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign”, *American Economic Review*, 105(1): 322–353.